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Abstract
This paper proposes a causal inference relation and causal program-
ming as general frameworks for causal inference with structural causal
models. A tuple, 〈M, I,Q, F 〉, is an instance of the relation if a formula,
F , computes a causal query, Q, as a function of known population prob-
abilities, I, in every model entailed by a set of model assumptions, M .
Many problems in causal inference can be viewed as the problem of
enumerating instances of the relation that satisfy given criteria. This
unifies a number of previously studied problems, including causal ef-
fect identification, causal discovery and recovery from selection bias. In
addition, the relation supports formalizing new problems in causal in-
ference with structural causal models, such as the problem of research
design. Causal programming is proposed as a further generalization
of causal inference as the problem of finding optimal instances of the
relation, with respect to a cost function.
1 Introduction
The development of formal reasoning about causality has roots in philoso-
phy, statistics, economics, and computer science, which has produced a wide
variety of different and conflicting terminology. There are many different no-
tations in use for the same concepts, but also many cases of different concepts
being referred to by the same name.
While a ‘grand unified theory’ of causation is well beyond the scope of a sin-
gle paper, this paper suggests that the proposed causal inference relation and
causal programming frameworks unify a large number of problems in causal
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modeling and inference that were previously treated as separate problems.
The frameworks also yield several extensions to existing problems, and sug-
gests how all of these problems may be amenable to automated inference.
This paper is part survey and part proposal and only assumes background
knowledge of basic probability theory and statistics. The sections “Desider-
ata for causal modeling and inference”, “Potential outcomes”, “The Heck-
man hierarchy”, “Structural causal models”, “Marschak’s maxim and causal
diagrams”, and “The causal hierarchy” discuss the potential outcome and
structural causal model approaches to causality and how they relate to each
other. Readers familiar with potential outcomes (Rubin causal model) and
structural causal models may wish to begin with “Causal inference as a log-
ical relation”, which introduces the proposed causal inference relation as a
general framework for studying problems in causal inference. “Restricted
causal inference relation” describes domains for the relation that unify sev-
eral previously studied problems. “Other domains for the causal inference
relation” gives examples of how the relation can be extended to represent
additional problems of interest. Finally, “Causal programming” is proposed
as a further generalization which casts causal inference problems as special
cases of a general optimization problem.
2 Desiderata for causal modeling and inference
Causality is an intuitive idea that can be difficult to rigorously formalize.
Causality is implicit in ordinary language [1], which makes it easy to acci-
dentally introduce unwarranted assumptions, or fail to introduce necessary
assumptions in analysis.
A core concept in causality is the idea that certain variables will respond
to changes in other variables. Consider Newton’s second law, relating force,
mass and acceleration, which simple algebra permits being written in three
different ways:
F = ma
m =
F
a
a =
F
m
2
Common intuition suggests that if the force applied to some object were in-
creased, it would experience greater acceleration; the mass of the object
would not spontaneously increase to compensate. In other words, force
causes acceleration, but does not causally effect changes in mass. This is not
clear from the standard presentation of the equations, treating the equals
sign as the equality relation, where all three equations are equivalent. Under
this interpretation of the equals sign, the equations specify a relationship
that must be satisfied, but do not specify how the system would respond to
an external action.
The three equations are different if the equals sign is treated as an assignment
operator — this interpretation may be more familiar to programmers.1 In
this case, only the third equation captures the intuition that if force were
increased, then acceleration would increase proportionally, as long as no
other changes to the system were made. Likewise, if mass were increased,
acceleration would decrease proportionally. Assumptions of this kind are
commonly referred to as ceteris paribus assumptions, literally, “other things
being equal”. In particular, ceteris paribus is a mainstay of economic analysis
[2].
This view of causality has its roots in neoclassical economics, especially in the
work of Mill [3] and Marshall [4] and was made more precise with Haavelmo’s
account of (linear) structural equation models [5]. Rubin and Holland [6]
provide a pithy motto that summarizes the main idea:
No causation without manipulation
This account of causality may not seem entirely satisfactory, depending on
how ‘manipulation’ is interpreted. For example, few would object to thinking
of the Sun’s gravity as a cause of Earth’s orbit, although, in practice, there
are a number of obstacles to significantly manipulating the Sun’s mass. This
does not change the expectation that if the Sun’s mass were suddenly zero,
then the Earth would not continue to orbit, no matter how implausible
actually implementing such a change would be.
Implicit in such examples of causation is the idea that some effect (Y ),
could have been different if a cause (X) had been different, regardless of
what was actually observed. Such hypotheticals are usually referred to as
‘counterfactuals’. The idea of defining causality in terms of counterfactuals
1One might observe that the meaning would be clearer if a different symbol such as :=
or <- was used to distinguish assignment from equality, but this convention has not been
widely adopted in causal modeling.
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originates with Hume, defining a cause to be, “. . . where, if the first object had
not been, the second never had existed” [7]. This idea was made more precise
with Lewis’ account of counterfactuals, using the possible world semantics
of modal logic [8]:
If c and e are two distinct actual events such that e would not
have occurred without c, then c is a cause of e.
A classic example of a counterfactual sentence is, “If Nixon had pressed the
button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust” [9], which features a
number of important characteristics of counterfactuals in general. It cannot
(nor should) be empirically tested, but it is still related to the observable
world — note that Nixon did not ever order a nuclear strike, nor is the
world a nuclear wasteland. The sentence also, indirectly, implies empirical
consequences. If the original counterfactual sentence is true, anyone acting
in a sufficiently similar scenario who does ‘press the button’ should expect a
nuclear holocaust.
The ideas of manipulations and counterfactuals are related. One view is
that a manipulation changes the original system or, more abstractly, gener-
ates a new model that represents the effects of the change. Alternatively,
the complete set of counterfactuals can be thought of as existing a priori
and related to observable variables by consistency constraints. Whether or
not counterfactuals ‘actually’ exist need not be a concern. Heckman sum-
marizes the relevant metaphysical concerns as, “A model is in the mind. As
a consequence, causality is in the mind” [2].
Crucially, the notion of counterfactuals is distinct from that of uncertainty —
note that there is no notation in probability theory for “would have been”. At
the same time, statements of causality often include a probabilistic aspect.
For example, most would interpret, “If the grass is wet, then it rained”,
as a statement that it is likely that rain caused grass to be wet, without
committing to a fully deterministic model such as Newton’s second law does.
To summarize, a satisfactory approach to causal modeling and inference
requires the distinct concepts of manipulation, counterfactuals and uncer-
tainty; treating any one of these as the same concept is a category error. In
addition, such an approach should concur with human intuition as much as
possible — a difficult to understand formalism makes it difficult for subject-
matter experts to formalize their domain knowledge.
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3 Potential outcomes (Rubin causal model)
The potential outcome approach to causal inference (also known as the Rubin
causal model, or the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model) provides a notation
suitable for representing counterfactual statements. The statement that “Y
would have taken on value y, if X had been x, for unit u” is written as:
Yx(u) = y
Units are primitives in the potential outcomes approach, which does not
define them further. Examples of units include individual patients in a clin-
ical setting, or individual plots of land in an agricultural study. Variables
(e.g. X, Y ) are real-valued functions defined for every unit; for example,
X is commonly defined to be treatment and Y defined to be response to
treatment in a clinical setting.
A particular quantity of interest is treatment effect2, which is defined as the
difference in response when a particular unit is exposed to treatment (X = t)
versus control (X = c):
Yt(u)− Yc(u)
Causal inference is difficult because, although there are many potential out-
comes for any particular variable, it is only possible to observe one actual
outcome. For example, it is impossible to treat and not treat the same
patient.3 Holland summarizes this as the Fundamental Problem of Causal
Inference:
It is impossible to observe the value of Yt(u) and Yc(u) on the
same unit and, therefore, it is impossible to observe the effect of
t on u.
Causal inference is impossible without making additional assumptions —
data alone provides no knowledge of how observations will generalize to other
2This quantity is sometimes referred to as ‘causal effect’ [6]; this paper adopts the
convention of referring to this as ‘treatment effect’ to avoid confusion with the structural
causal model definition of causal effect.
3One might object that it is possible to not treat a patient initially, and then treat the
same patient later, but these are different units. The patient’s condition after waiting long
enough to observe the effects of non-treatment is different than their initial condition.
5
circumstances. An example of a simple assumption that makes causal infer-
ence possible is unit homogeneity, which can be thought of as ‘laboratory
conditions’. If different units are carefully prepared, it may be reasonable to
assume that they are equivalent in all relevant aspects, i.e. Yt(u1) = Yt(u2)
and Yc(u1) = Yc(u2). For example, it is often assumed that any two samples
of a given chemical element are effectively identical. In these cases, treat-
ment effect can be calculated directly as Yt(u1)−Yc(u2). However, it is often
the case that such tightly controlled conditions are impossible to maintain.
Accordingly, the main focus of the potential outcomes approach is on average
effects.
A probability distribution over the universe of units, P (u), induces a prob-
ability distribution over the potential outcome variables. Formally [10]:
P (Yx = y) =
∑
{u | Yx(u)=y}
P (u)
Since the potential outcome variables are random variables, it is meaningful
to speak of average treatment effects. In particular, expected value (E) is a
linear operator which permits writing:
E(Yt − Yc) = E(Yt)− E(Yc)
In other words, it is possible to estimate average treatment effect by esti-
mating E(Yt) and E(Yc) individually. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
sample from either of these random variables directly. Yt is treatment over
the entire universe of units, a counterfactual world where every patient was
exposed to treatment. Actual samples would be from the random variable
Y . Although these variables are different, they are still related to each other
by the consistency rule [11], [12]:
X(u) = x =⇒ Y (u) = Yx(u)
In other words, if the variable X is observed to take on value x, then the
potential response Yx is simply the current value of Y . An immediate conse-
quence of consistency is: P (Yx = y | X = x) = P (Y = y | X = x). Further-
more, if response to treatment Yx is independent of treatment (Yx ⊥⊥ X),
then the following equalities hold:
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E(Y | X = t) = E(Yt)
E(Y | X = c) = E(Yc)
In this case, average treatment effect can be estimated directly from the
collected samples as E(Y | X = t) − E(Y | X = c). This expression is
sometimes referred to as the prima facie treatment effect [6].
However, there are many scenarios where selection of treatment is not inde-
pendent of response to treatment. Consider the question of whether smoking
is a cause of cancer. The prima facie effect may be significant. However, it
is conceivable that there exists a latent genetic factor that predisposes in-
dividuals to smoke, and also makes them more susceptible to cancer.4 This
is an example of the well-known problem of confounding variables and the
possibility of latent confounding variables is especially difficult to rule out.
The potential outcomes approach generally operates by making indepen-
dence assumptions about potential outcome variables. Randomization, i.e.
the samples were obtained in a randomized controlled trial, makes the as-
sumption5 Yx ⊥⊥ X especially plausible since — at least, theoretically — the
selection of treatment or non-treatment for each unit is determined entirely
by an independent source of randomness. In practice, there may be issues
with imperfect compliance (i.e. some patients may fail to take the drugs they
are assigned), but randomized controlled trials remain the ‘gold standard’
for causal evidence.
Another common type of assumption that can permit causal inference is
conditional ignorability, (Yx ⊥⊥ X | Z), which is the statement that Yx and
X are conditionally independent given Z, a set of covariates that are being
‘adjusted’ or ‘controlled’ for. For example, if it were known that there was
a genetic factor Z (and no other such factors) that caused both smoking
and cancer, then it would be reasonable to assume conditional ignorability,
which would permit the following derivation [10]:
4Statistician Ronald Fisher is infamous for having spoke out against studies linking
smoking to cancer, while being ardent tobacco user himself. He later died of cancer.
However, his actual objections to the studies were not incorrect.
5This condition is referred as ‘no confounding’, ‘exogenity’ or ‘ignorability’, depending
on the source [10], [13], [14].
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P (Yx = y) =
∑
z
P (Yx = y | z)P (z)
=
∑
z
P (Yx = y | x, z)P (z)
=
∑
z
P (Y = y | x, z)P (z)
=
∑
z
P (y | x, z)P (z)
The notation belies a fundamental shift in perspective: the formula computes
a potential outcome variable, P (Yx), entirely in terms of observable proba-
bilities, P (y | x, z) and P (z), with respect to the assumption of conditional
ignorability.
There are two problems that have not been directly addressed. First, in
practice, an analyst only has access to a finite-sample distribution Pˆ , instead
of the true population distribution P . The other problem lies in justifying
the conditional independence assumptions used in analysis. For example,
what does it mean for conditional ignorability to be true, and how would an
analyst judge if such an assumption is reasonable?
4 The Heckman hierarchy
Reasoning about causality benefits from maintaining clear distinctions be-
tween different tasks in causal inference. In particular, Heckman [2] identifies
three distinct tasks in causal inference that are often conflated in practice:
1. Definitions of counterfactuals
2. Identification of models/parameters from population distributions
3. Selection of models from real data (i.e. sampling distributions)
The potential outcomes approach, combined with other statistical tools, pro-
vides a way of performing all of these tasks. The potential outcome syntax
permits analysts to formally write independence assumptions about poten-
tial outcome variables, implicitly defining the nature of the counterfactuals.
The rules of probability theory combined with algebraic manipulations (may)
permit identification of quantities of interest from population distributions,
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e.g. P (Yx = y) =
∑
z P (y | x, z)P (z), assuming conditional ignorability.
Finally, estimation and hypothesis testing theory provide a way to calcu-
late confidence intervals from sampled data and accept or reject hypotheses
appropriately.
However, the potential outcomes notation, alone, provides an incomplete
definition of counterfactuals. It provides a formal way of writing, for exam-
ple, that response to treatment (Yx) is independent of treatment (X), but
does not provide a formal definition of what it means for this assumption to
be true or false. In the language of formal logic, potential outcomes nota-
tion provides syntax but not semantics for causal statements. Giving these
statements meaning requires formalizing the notion of a causal model.
5 Structural causal models
Consider a simple economic model of propensity to consume, assuming all
prices are constant. As an example, Haavelmo suggests a model where, “if
the group of all consumers in society were repeatedly furnished with the
total income or purchasing power x per year, they would, on the average or
‘normally,’ spend a total amount y equal to” [5]:
y = βx+ α
Where α and β are constants. Naturally, it would be unreasonable to expect
that, in any particular year, spending would be exactly equal to y. This
is not merely a consequence measurement errors — presumably there are a
large number of additional factors that could affect spending that are not
directly accounted for in this simple model. These additional factors can
be indirectly represented by adding a residual or ‘error term’ to the original
equation:
y = βx+ α+ 
Where  is random variable with mean value zero, regardless of the value of
x. This is a simple example of a structural equation model (SEM).
Haavelmo is notable for being among the first to explicitly interpret such
equations as predicting the result of idealized experiments. It may be the
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case that an analyst is merely trying to fit the equation to the past and hopes
that the relation holds in the future, assuming no significant changes to the
underlying system. A stronger assumption is that consumers will continue
to respond in the same way to income, regardless of the sources from which
their income originates. With respect to this assumption, it is possible to
predict the result of an intervention (e.g. government spending or taxation)
to set income at a given level. Pearl further formalizes this interpretation of
structural equations:
Definition 1 (Structural Equations [10]) An equation y = βx+ is said
to be structural if it is to be interpreted as follows: In an ideal experiment
where we control X to x and any other set Z of variables (not containing X
or Y ) to z, the value y of Y is given by βx+  where  is not a function of
the settings x and z.
Note that this definition assumes an ideal experiment to control X. Many
manipulations that are theoretically simple can turn out to be difficult or
impossible to implement in practice. This is not a strike against the defi-
nition, but a warning to carefully model interventions as well as the causal
relationships themselves.
The philosophy of causality adopted here is that of Laplacian (quasi-) de-
terminism. The residual, , represents all of the additional factors that de-
termine Y that are not directly modeled. In principle, if these factors were
completely known, it would be possible to exactly determine how Y would
respond to any change. In this view, randomness is a statement of analyst’s
ignorance, not inherent to the system itself.
This is related to the potential outcomes approach, which considers potential
outcome variables to be real-valued functions of ‘units’. Since units are prim-
itives and not defined further, these functions are implicit. In comparison,
structural equation modeling works with explicit functions, where variables
are functions of all of their determining factors.
One of the weaknesses of structural equation modeling is that it makes very
strong assumptions — usually, linearity and the assumption that all variables
are multivariate normal. It is perhaps unsurprising then that many analysts
are reluctant to assign causal meaning to the equations and consider them
to be merely a ‘shorthand’ way to represent a joint probability distribution.
The linearity assumption, in particular, is very restrictive — the earlier ex-
ample of Newton’s second law violates it. Consider, also, the smoking/cancer
example, where X is smoking, Y is cancer, and Z is a possible genetic factor
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that predisposes one to smoke and can cause cancer. These assumptions can
be captured in the following three equations:
Example 1 (Smoking/cancer model)
Z = fZ(Z)
X = fX(Z, X)
Y = fY (X,Y, Y )
Where each fi is some — likely nonlinear – function. X,Y, Z are called
‘endogenous variables’ since they are determined by factors in the model.
X , Y , Z are called ‘background variables’ since they are determined by
outside factors that are not directly accounted for.6
This nonlinear generalization of structural equation models with arbitrarily
distributed background variables originates with Pearl and Verma [15] and
has been referred to by several different names including ‘probabilistic causal
models’, ‘graphical causal models’ and ‘structural causal models’. The name
‘structural causal models’ will be used in this paper, since it appears to be
least likely to name clash with other terms in the literature.
Definition 2 (Structural Causal Model [16]) A structural causal model
M is a tuple M = 〈U, V, F, P (u)〉, where:
1. A set U of background (also called exogenous) variables, that are de-
termined by factors outside the model
2. A set V = {V1, . . . Vn} of variables, called endogenous, that are deter-
mined by variables in the model — that is, variables in U ∪ V ;
3. F is a set of functions {f1, . . . , fn} such that each fi is a mapping
from (the respective domains of) Ui ∪ PAi to Vi, where Ui ⊆ U and
PAi ⊆ V \ Vi and the entire set F forms a mapping from U to V ;
4. P (u) is a probability function defined over the domain of U .
6These are sometimes referred to as ‘exogenous’ variables. Unfortunately, ‘exogeneity’
is often used to refer to a number of subtly different conditions between sets of variables
in a causal model. To avoid confusion, the term ‘background variable’ will be used in this
paper.
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Note that the definition of structural causal models requires that the set of
equations, F , form a mapping from U to V . In other words, F has a unique
solution for V as a function of U . A sufficient condition for this is that
the system is recursive, i.e. there are no cyclic dependencies in the parent
(PAi) sets of the endogenous variables. A key difficulty with nonrecursive
systems in structural causal models is that they may require solving systems
of nonlinear equations; this paper will not consider nonrecursive systems.
Structural causal models provide a straightforward definition of interven-
tions. Consider an action to force some set of variables X to take on partic-
ular values x; this is represented using the do() operator.
Definition 3 (Effect of action [10]) Let M be a causal model, X a set
of variables in V , and x a particular realization of X. The effect of action
do(X = x) on M is given by the submodel Mx.
Definition 4 (Submodel [10]) Let M be a causal model, X a set of vari-
ables in V , and x a particular realization of X. A submodel Mx of M is the
causal model:
Mx = 〈U, V, Fx, P (u)〉
Where:
Fx = {fi : vi /∈ X} ∪ {X = x}
A submodel produced by do(X = x) can be thought of as the result of ‘wip-
ing out’ each fi that determines each Xi, and replacing fi with the constant
xi, a process which Pearl colorfully refers to as performing “surgery on equa-
tions” [10]. As an example, consider an idealized intervention to determine
the causal effect of smoking on cancer. In the original model,M , the decision
to smoke (X) is a function of a background variable (X) and a genetic factor
(Z) that both predisposes one to smoke and affects cancer risk. The inter-
vention, do(X = x), effectively ‘cuts out’ the confounding from the genetic
factor and produces a new model, Mx, in which the factors that determine
Z and Y are unchanged, but X has been set to the value x:
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Example 2 (Smoking/cancer submodel)
Z = fZ(Z)
X = x
Y = fY (X,Y, Y )
Given the definitions of a submodel and effect of action, the relationship be-
tween potential outcomes and structural causal models is remarkably straight-
forward:
Definition 5 (Potential Response [10]) Let X and Y be two subsets of
variables in V . The potential response of y to action do(X = x), denoted
Yx(u), is the solution for Y of the set of equations Fx, that is, Yx(u) =
YMx(u).
The probability of y, given the action do(X = x) is denoted7 by either
P (y | do(x)) or P (Yx) and is induced by the probability distribution over
the background variables, P (u), and the submodel, Mx:
P (Yx = y) = P (y | do(x)) =
∑
{u | YMx (u)=y}
P (u)
This establishes the theoretical connection between potential outcomes and
structural causal models. It also highlights the philosophical differences be-
tween traditional structural equation modeling and potential outcome anal-
ysis. In structural equation modeling, equations are usually assumed to
be linear, with the random variables being multivariate normal. In other
words, structural equation modeling relies on strong and explicit model as-
sumptions. Potential outcome analysis is effectively the opposite; the model
assumptions are weak and implicit. Independence assumptions between po-
tential outcome variables implicitly constrain the set of possible causal mod-
els under consideration, but do not provide much guidance on determining
what that set is.
7Other notations, including Px(y) and P (y | xˆ) are in use, but will not be used in
this paper. In particular, the ‘hat’ notation risks confusion with the standard statistical
practice of denoting estimates of random variables with a hat.
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6 Marschak’s maxim and causal diagrams
Heckman coined ‘Marschak’s Maxim’, in honor of an insight by Marschak
[17]:
Forecasting policies may require only partial knowledge of the
system.
From the definition, a complete specification of a structural causal model
requires specifying the functions that determine each endogenous variable
and the probability distribution over the background variables. The former
is often difficult to know; the later is often impossible, considering that the
background variables are usually the very factors that cannot be directly
accounted for.
Marschak’s maxim is a reminder that a partial specification of a model may
still be sufficient to conduct causal inference. A set of independence as-
sumptions made in a potential outcomes analysis implicitly denotes a set of
possible models. Causal diagrams are another approach.
Every causal model induces a causal diagram, where each vertex in the di-
agram corresponds to an endogenous variable, Vi, and directed edges point
from members of PAi to Vi. If the background variables are jointly indepen-
dent and each background variable appears in only one PAi set, the model
is called Markovian and the joint probability function, P (v), will respect
the Markov condition, i.e. every variable is conditionally independent of its
non-descendants, given its parents [10]. Otherwise, the model is called semi-
Markovian. Dependencies between endogenous variables due to background
variables are denoted by dashed, bidirectional edges.8 For example, if the ge-
netic factor in the smoking/cancer example were known and measurable, the
model would be Markovian; otherwise, the model would be semi-Markovian
and X and Y would have a dashed, bidirectional edge between them to
denote the dependency (figure 1).
There is a useful correspondence between causal diagrams and causal models.
Every causal model induces a causal diagram, and every causal diagram has
at least one model (in fact, infinitely many) that would induce it. In this
sense, a casual diagram can be thought of as denoting a set of models where
each endogenous variable is assumed to be a function its parents, without
8An alternative convention is to enter observable variables as solid nodes and latent
variables as hollow nodes.
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X Y
Z
(a)
X Y
(b)
Figure 1: Markovian and semi-Markovian causal diagrams
committing to an assumption of what the function is.
Inference in the structural causal model approach is generally performed
with respect to the assumptions entailed by a causal diagram. For example,
calculating the causal effect of X on Y in the smoking/cancer model is a
simple adjustment for direct causes.
Theorem 6 (Adjustment for Direct Causes [10]) Let PAi denote the
set of direct causes of variable Xi and let Y be any set of variables disjoint
of {Xi ∪ PAi}. The effect of the intervention do(Xi = xi) on Y is given by:
P (Y | do(xi)) =
∑
pai
P (y | xi, pai)P (pai)
Applying this theorem to the smoking/cancer example with observable Z
yields:
P (y | do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y | x, z)P (z)
Formally, it is said that the probabilities P (y | x, z) and P (z) and the causal
diagram identify P (y | do(x)). Note that if Z is latent, then P (y | do(x)) is
not identifiable. Intuitively, there is no way of knowing if correlation between
X and Y is due to the latent factor, or due to the effect of X on Y .
Unsurprisingly, this is the same result as from the potential outcomes anal-
ysis. In the potential outcomes approach, the set of causal models under
consideration is implicitly specified by the conditional independence assump-
tions between potential outcome variables. Causal diagrams more explicitly
denote the set of models under consideration, and consider properties like
conditional independences to be a consequence of the model assumptions
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entailed in the diagram. In both cases, Marschak’s maxim is in play. A
complete specification of the model is not needed to calculate the causal
effect; the formula correctly calculates P (y | do(x)) for all models under
consideration.
Note that incorrectly adjusting for variables can produce biased estimates of
causal effect. Consider a model where X is treatment, Y is recovery, and Z is
blood pressure, which causally affects recovery, and is affected by treatment
(figure 2). An adjustment for direct causes should not be performed in this
case, since Z is not a direct cause of X. Intuitively, adjusting for blood
pressure ‘blocks’ the causal effect of X on Y that is mediated through Z.
X Y
Z
Figure 2: Blood pressure causal diagram
7 The causal hierarchy
The previous sections have focused on examples of identifying causal effects,
e.g. “If a patient is treated, will they recover?” Queries about causal effects
are only one of the possible queries in the full causal hierarchy [18]:
1. Statistical/associational: queries involving no interventions. For ex-
ample, “If I observe that a patient has been exposed to X = x, how
likely is it that they will recover (Y = y)?” i.e. P (y | x)
2. Causal/interventional: queries about the result of outside interven-
tions. For example, “If I treat a patient, how likely is it that they will
recover?” i.e. P (y | do(x)) or P (Yx = y)
3. Counterfactual: queries involving multiple hypothetical worlds. For
example, “Given that a patient was exposed to x, how likely is it that
they would have recovered, even if they had not been exposed (X =
x′)?” i.e. P (Yx′ = y | x)
This forms a hierarchy, in that each successive class of queries includes the
previous as a special case. Statistical queries only involve the original model;
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a joint probability distribution is sufficient to compute such a query. Causal
queries are questions about a system after an external intervention, i.e.
queries about the submodel resulting from a do() action. The combination
of the pre-intervention joint probability distribution and a Markovian causal
diagram is sufficient to answer causal queries [10]. Finally, counterfactual
queries span multiple models. A counterfactual query can contain ‘conflict-
ing’ information, asking about the same variable taking on different values
in different hypothetical worlds. For example, P (Yx′ = y | x) is called the ef-
fect of treatment on the treated [19] and considers two ‘parallel worlds’: one
where the patient was treated and one where the patient was not. Although
these are different models, they share the same background variables and
functional relationships (i.e. the fi equations). Intuitively, the mechanisms
that determine whether or not a patient recovers remain the same across
the hypothetical worlds, even if the assignment of treatment/non-treatment
does not.
In general, answering counterfactual queries requires knowledge of the func-
tional relationships and information about the distribution of the background
variables. Note that even data from a randomized controlled trial may be in-
sufficient, since it is impossible to simultaneously treat and not treat the same
patient. However, there are special cases in which counterfactual queries can
be identified from less complete knowledge. For example, there exists a
graphical criterion for identifying the effect of treatment on the treated [19].
With respect to certain causal diagrams, it is possible to determine the effect
of treatment on the treated from the pre-intervention distribution and the
diagram’s causal assumptions alone.
X YZ
Figure 3: A causal diagram where P (Yx = y | x′) =
∑
z P (y | z, x)P (z | x′)
[19]
8 Causal inference as a logical relation
The main original contribution of this paper is to introduce the causal infer-
ence relation:
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〈M, I,Q, F 〉V
Where:
• M is a set of model assumptions, entailing a set of structural causal
models
• I is a set of information; specifically, a set of known population prob-
abilities
• Q is a query from the causal hierarchy
• F is a formula that computes Q as a function of the information set
I, that holds true for every model entailed by M
• V is the set of endogenous variables under consideration
The causal inference relation is indexed by V ; there is a relation for each set
of endogenous variables. V can be thought of as the set of all variables that
can be potentially manipulated and/or measured.
M is a finite set of model assumptions, which may permit denoting an infi-
nite set of structural causal models under consideration. A causal diagram,
typically denoted G, is a particularly compact representation of model as-
sumptions. In principle, M can be any restriction on the set of all recursive
structural causal models; this includes such assumptions as conditional inde-
pendence assumptions between potential outcome variables, or restrictions
on the functional relationships, such as the assumption that all fi are linear.
However, the set of all causal diagrams over V will serve as the main example
of the domain of M .
The information set, I, can be thought of as the data collected about a
particular system, albeit idealized, large-sample data, since I is defined to
be population, not sample probabilities. A familiar information set is the
pre-intervention joint probability function, often referred the ‘observational’
probability distribution. This is typically denoted P (v) or P . I may also
be extended to include other population probabilities. For example, it may
be the case that, in addition to observational data, experimental data for a
limited subset of variables is available. Such an I could be represented as
P (v | do(z′)), ∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, where Z is some subset of V that an analyst can
directly manipulate and observe the effects of. Note that this includes the
observational probability distribution, as P (v | do(z′)) = P (v) when Z ′ is the
empty set. Unless otherwise stated, it will be assumed that all probability
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distributions are (strictly) positive, i.e. P (v) > 0, ∀v, as this is required by
many theorems in causal inference.
A query, Q, can be any query from the causal hierarchy. This paper focuses
mainly on causal effect queries, e.g. P (y | do(x)).
Finally, the formula, F , computes Q as a function of I, in all models entailed
byM . Note that if the information set is symbolic, then the resulting formula
will also be symbolic. If numerical probabilities are available, evaluating the
formula will yield the appropriate value for the query. In principle, F could
be extended to include bounds on a query, but this paper focuses on exact
results.
The simplest problem involving the causal inference relation is determining
whether a given tuple 〈M, I,Q, F 〉 is an instance of the causal inference
relation. For example, M = (figure 1a), I = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)),
and F =
∑
z P (y | x, z)P (z) is a valid instance of the relation. The same
tuple, but with M = (figure 2) instead is not an instance the relation, since
F does not correctly compute the query in all models entailed by M .
The causal inference relation provides a general framework for studying prob-
lems in causal inference. Many problems in causal inference can be seen as
finding an instance, or enumerating all the instances, of the causal inference
relation that satisfy given criteria. These problems can be broadly catego-
rized by which of M, I,Q are given:
• M, I,Q - Identification: the problem of finding a formula to compute
a causal query
• I,Q - Causal discovery: the problem of enumerating the models that
are compatible with given population probabilities
• M,Q - Research design: the problem determining the observational
and/or experimental information that must be collected to answer a
given query
• M, I - Query generation: the problem of enumerating identifiable queries
Note that problems where F is given are not considered, as they represent
methodologically suspect practices. For example, searching for M , given I,
Q and F is an attempt to find a post hoc rationalization for a calculation of
a causal effect that has already been performed.
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8.1 Identification
Consider a variant of the smoking/cancer model where the effect of smoking
(X) on lung cancer (Y ) is mediated through tar deposits in a person’s lungs
(Z) [20]. In addition, there may exist a latent factor that directly causes
both X and Y , but not Z. These model assumptions are encoded in the
causal diagram in figure 3. Furthermore, suppose that an analyst knows
the joint pre-intervention distribution, P (x, y, z), and wishes to compute the
causal effect of X on Y , P (y | do(x)).
This corresponds to the following problem: find one instance of the causal
inference relation such thatM = (figure 3), I = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)).
Since Z satisfies the front-door criterion [20], Q can be computed using a
front-door adjustment. A full solution to this problem is 〈M, I,Q, F 〉 where
M, I and Q are as given, and F is:
∑
z
P (z | x)
∑
x′
P (y | x′, z)P (x′)
It is possible for there to be several instances of the causal inference relation
that satisfy given criteria. For example, the instances of the causal infer-
ence relation that satisfy M = (figure 4), I = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x))
includes solutions 〈M, I,Q, F1〉 and 〈M, I,Q, F2〉, where F1 is as in the pre-
vious example, and F2 is simply P (y | x). In an identification problem, an
analyst is usually only interested in finding one solution. However, there
are other causal inference problems where finding multiple solutions is of
interest.
X YZ
Figure 4: A causal diagram without latent confounding variables
Conversely, there may be no instances of the causal inference relation that
satisfy given criteria. Searching for instances of the causal inference relation
that satisfy M = (figure 5), I = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)) will fail, since
Q cannot be uniquely computed in all models entailed by M .
Treating the full tuple 〈M, I,Q, F 〉 as the solution — as opposed to just the
formula, F — may seem redundant for identification problems. The utility
of this approach becomes more apparent for less restrictive search criteria.
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X YZ
Figure 5: A causal diagram where P (y | do(x)) is not identifiable
8.2 Causal discovery
If a causal diagram is not specified, then causal inference becomes a problem
of causal discovery. As a simple example, consider an analyst that is studying
a system with two endogenous variables. Suppose the analyst knows that the
variables are dependent, knows the joint observational probability function,
i.e. I = P (x, y), where X 6⊥⊥ Y , and wishes to infer the causal effect of X
on Y , i.e. Q = P (y | do(x)).
X Y X Y X Y
X Y X Y
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 6: Causal diagrams that are Markov compatible with I
A causal diagram and probability function are said to be Markov compatible
if the probability function respects the conditional independences implied
by the Markov condition. There are two causal diagrams that are Markov
compatible with I that also permit identification of Q: M1 = (figure 6a) and
M2 = (figure 6b). This corresponds to the following instances of the causal
relation: 〈M1, I, Q, F1〉 and 〈M2, I, Q, F2〉, where:
F1 = P (y | x)
F2 = P (y)
If the domain of M is limited to the space of Markovian causal diagrams,
then this set of solutions is also complete, in the sense that every causal
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diagram that is Markov compatible with I is contained in one of the enu-
merated instances of causal inference relation. However, if the domain of M
also includes semi-Markovian causal diagrams, then there are several causal
diagrams that are compatible with I that do not permit identification of Q.
Note that any causal diagram where all endogenous variables share a com-
mon, latent cause is Markov compatible with every joint observational prob-
ability function P (v). This has consequences for interpreting the results of
causal discovery. It is generally incorrect to treat causal discovery as defini-
tively determining the causes of variables in a system. Instead, a discovered
model can be viewed as a set of additional, compatible assumptions that will
permit answering a given query. Causal discovery will usually be incomplete,
since non-identifiable models remain a possibility, unless explicitly ruled out
by domain knowledge.
Causal discovery usually relies the assumption that P is faithful to G (this
condition is also called ‘stability’ [10]), which is the assumption that every
conditional independence relationship that is true in P is entailed by the
Markov condition [21]. For example, if I = P (x, y), where X ⊥⊥ Y , then
P is Markov compatible with every diagram in figure 6. However, P is not
faithful to any of these diagrams; intuitively, the edges between X and Y
suggest a dependency between the variables that is not present.
8.3 Research design
If the information set is not specified, then causal inference becomes a prob-
lem of research design. As an example, consider a scenario where an analyst
wishes to calculate P (y | do(x)) with respect to the causal diagram in figure
7.
W1
W3
W4
W2
W5
YX W6
Figure 7: A causal diagram adapted from [20]
The complete joint observational probability function P (v) is sufficient, but
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unnecessary. In particular, an analyst may be interested in calculating causal
effect from less information when it is expensive, or otherwise difficult to
obtain the complete joint observational probability function. By the back-
door criterion [20], P (y | do(x)) can be computed as either:
F1 =
∑
x3,x4
P (y | w3, w4, x)P (w3, w4)
F2 =
∑
x4,x5
P (y | w4, w5, x)P (w4, w5)
Solutions are sensitive to the domain and representation of I. One possible
representation of I1 is P (y | w3, w4, x), P (w3, w4). However, this implies a
somewhat cumbersome domain for I and can make it difficult to determine
equivalent information sets. For example, the information set P (y | x), P (x)
is semantically, but not syntactically, equivalent to P (x, y). A less expressive,
but simpler domain for I is the set of joint observational probability functions
over subsets of V . This domain has a natural partial order: an information
set, P (v1), is included in a more general information set, P (v2), if V1 ⊂ V2.
In this context, minimal information sets to calculate P (y | do(x)) are I1 =
P (x, y, w3, w4) and I2 = P (x, y, w4, w5).
8.4 Query generation
If the query is not specified, then causal inference becomes a problem of
query generation. Note that the number of identifiable queries has the po-
tential to be very large. For example, if I = P (v), and M is a Markovian
causal diagram, then all queries of the form P (y1, . . . , ym | do(x1, . . . , xn))
are identifiable, which is exponential in |V |. Tractable query generation gen-
erally requires some restriction on the space of queries or a willingness to
accept an incomplete set of solutions.
As a simple example of query generation, consider the problem of generating
all queries that either involve the causal effect on Y , i.e. P (y | do(. . .))
or involve manipulating x, i.e. P (. . . | do(x))), with M = (figure 8) and
I = P (v). Two such queries are identifiable: Q1 = P (y | do(x)), and
Q2 = P (z | do(x)).
Query generation can be combined with the other causal inference tasks.
For example, starting with a known joint probability function, causal dis-
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X Z Y
Figure 8: A semi-Markovian causal diagram
covery can enumerate Markov compatible models, with query generation to
enumerate identifiable queries for each Markov compatible model.
9 Restricted causal inference relation
The causal inference relation can be useful as a conceptual framework, but
it is not a practical way of analyzing causal inference problems unless the
domains of M , I and Q are appropriately restricted; note that if M can
include arbitrary model assumptions, then conducting causal inference may
require invoking arbitrary mathematical theorems.
Several previously studied problems can be cleanly expressed as special cases
of finding instances of the causal inference relation. In particular, identifica-
tion has several subproblems that permit complete algorithms, in the sense
that if it is possible to identify Q from M and I, then the algorithm is guar-
anteed to find an appropriate F . Let G be a Markovian or semi-Markovian
causal diagram, P (v) be the joint observational probability function, andW ,
X, Y , and Z each be subsets of V :
• Causal effect identification (ID) [22], [23]: M = G, I = P (v), Q =
P (y | do(x))
• Conditional causal effect identification (IDC) [24]: M = G, I = P (v),
Q = P (y | w, do(x))
• Causal effect identification via surrogate experiments (zID) [25]: M =
G, I = P (v | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, Q = P (y | do(x))
A zIDC algorithm, combining the capabilities of IDC and zID, would corre-
spond to M = G, I = P (v | do(z′)), ∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, Q = P (y | w, do(x)). Finding
a complete algorithm for zIDC appears to be an open problem.
Causal discovery can be performed with Inductive Causation (IC) [15]. Given
a probability distribution P and assuming faithfulness, IC outputs a pattern,
which denotes an equivalence class of causal diagrams. If the underlying
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model is known to be Markovian, then IC is also complete, in that the
resulting pattern will correspond to the complete set of causal diagrams that
are Markov compatible with P . Otherwise, IC will produce a pattern that
includes many, but not all, compatible semi-Markovian models.
a
b c
d
e
∗
Figure 9: A marked pattern [10]. Marked edges, e.g. d → e, signify a
directed edge in the underlying model. Directed edges, e.g. b→ d, represent
either b → d or a latent common cause of both b and d. Undirected edges,
e.g. a — b, represent either a← b, a→ b, or a latent common cause.
Inductive Causation leaves the details of some its steps unspecified. In par-
ticular, IC requires searching for a set Sab such that (a ⊥⊥ b | Sab) for every
pair of variables a and b in V , but does not specify how such sets should be
found. The PC algorithm [26] is a refinement of IC that runs in polynomial
time on fixed-degree graphs. The combination of IC-based algorithms and
identification algorithms permit finding instances of the causal inference re-
lation that correspond to known I and Q. For example, the combination of
PC and ID would permit finding instances of the causal inference relation
that correspond to I = P (v), Q = P (y | do(x))
Problems related to research design have been discussed in the structural
causal model literature; for example, Pearl notes that the front-door and
back-door criteria permit an analyst a degree of freedom in selecting which
set of covariates to adjust for when calculating causal effect [10]. However,
the more general problem of finding instances of the causal inference rela-
tion corresponding to given M and Q does not appear to have an existing,
standard formulation. Similarly, query generation is implicitly considered in
the analysis of identification, but does not appear to have been formulated
as a problem in its own right.
All of these problems can be unified as special cases of finding instances of
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the causal inference relation, with the following domains for M , I and Q:
• M : Markovian and semi-Markovian causal diagrams over V . Causal
diagrams can be represented as G = (V,E,C) where (V,E) forms a
directed acyclic graph and C is a confounding family of V , correspond-
ing to the dashed edges that represent latent confounding. A Sperner
family is a collection of subsets of a given set, such that none of the
subsets contain any of the others [27]. This paper defines a confound-
ing family of V to be a Sperner family, with the further requirement
that none of the subsets of V are singleton.
• I: Information sets that can be represented as P (w | do(z′)), ∀Z ′ ⊆ Z,
for a given Z ⊆ W and W ⊆ V . Note that this is simply P (v) when
W = V and Z = ∅. This representation has a natural partial order:
an information set I1 is said to be contained in another information
set I2 if W1 ⊆W2 and Z1 ⊆ Z2.
• Q: Queries that can be represented as P (y | w, do(x)) for a given
w ⊆ V, x ⊆ V, y ⊆ V .
With respect to these domains, the following are suggested as canonical
formulations of causal inference problems:
• Identification (zIDC): Given M, I,Q, find one instance of the causal
inference relation 〈M, I,Q, F 〉.
• Causal discovery: Given I,Q, enumerate 〈Mi, I, Q, Fi〉 for distinct Mi,
i.e. for any two enumerated instances of the causal inference relation,
〈M1, I, Q, F1〉 and 〈M2, I, Q, F2〉, M1 6=M2
• Research design: Given M,Q, enumerate 〈M, Ii, Q, Fi〉, for distinct,
minimal Ii, i.e. for any enumerated instance of the causal inference re-
lation, 〈M, Ii, Q, Fi〉, there does not exist another instance 〈M, Ij , Q, Fj〉
such that Ii is contained in Ij
• Query generation: GivenM, I, enumerate 〈M, I,Qi, Fi〉 for distinct Qi
The combination of the axioms of probability theory and the inference rules
of Pearl’s causal calculus [20] are known to be complete for the ID, IDC and
zID problems [22], [24], [25]. This paper conjectures that they are complete
for all of the problems above as well. Furthermore, if a complete zIDC algo-
rithm exists, it would constitute a complete — albeit intractable, for larger
|V | — solution for all of these problems. Causal discovery, research design
and query generation problems can be reduced to identification problems
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by instantiating all possible Markov compatible causal diagrams, informa-
tion sets, or queries, respectively, and running an identification algorithm for
each instantiation.
10 Other domains for the causal inference relation
Other problems in causal inference can be represented in the causal inference
relation framework by modifying the domain of the relation appropriately.
In particular, the problems of identification of counterfactuals and recovery
from selection bias require only minor extensions to Q and I, respectively.
Identification of counterfactuals can be represented by extending the domain
of possible queries. Let G be a causal diagram, γ and δ be conjunctions
of counterfactual events, e.g. Yx, Zw, in the potential outcomes notation,
and P∗ be the set of all experiments, i.e. P (v | do(z′)), ∀Z ′ ⊆ V . With
respect to these domains, the following problems are known to have complete
algorithms [18]:
• Counterfactual identification (ID*): M = G, I = P∗, Q = P (γ)
• Conditional counterfactual identification (IDC*): M = G, I = P∗,
Q = P (γ | δ)
Selection bias can be represented by extending information sets to include
“s-biased” data [28], i.e. P (v | S = 1), where S represents a binary indicator
of entry into the data pool. For example [16], in studying the effect of a
training program on earnings, subjects achieving higher incomes may tend
to report their earnings more frequently than those who earn less. Recovery
from selection bias is the problem of answering queries about the general
population, despite the data being collected under selection bias. This data
may be accompanied by unbiased data, P (t), over some subset T ⊂ V .
Bareinboim [16] outlines several problems related to selection bias:
• Selection without external data: M = G, I = P (v | S = 1), Q = P (y |
x)
• Selection with external data: M = G, I = P (v | S = 1), P (t), Q =
P (y | x)
• Selection in causal inferences: M = G, I = P (v | S = 1), P (t), Q =
P (y | do(x))
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Complete identification criteria exist for selection without external data. Suf-
ficient criteria and a valid algorithm for computing selection with external
data and selection in causal inferences exist, but are not known to be com-
plete. In particular, identification in the presence of both selection bias and
latent confounding (i.e. in semi-Markovian models) is particularly difficult
[16].
Note that there are many causal inference problems that are not represented
in this paper’s formulation of the causal inference relation. There is no notion
of providing bounds for query, when an exact result cannot be computed.
Causal diagrams are the only form of model assumptions, which excludes
parametric assumptions and nonrecursive (i.e. cyclic) systems. And the
problem of external validity, i.e. generalizing results to a different environ-
ment from which the original data was collected, is not considered. In prin-
ciple, the relation could be modified to represent these problems, but this
would add considerable complexity. Introducing problems into the frame-
work requires careful selection of the domains ofM , I, Q and F to represent
the problem of interest, while still permitting a small set of complete infer-
ence rules.
11 Causal programming
The causal inference relation casts problems in causal inference as the prob-
lem of finding instances of a logical relation. Causal programming is proposed
as a further generalization of causal inference as an optimization problem.
The problem is to find optimal instances of the causal inference relation with
respect to a cost function:
minimize g(M, I,Q)
subject to ∃F : 〈M, I,Q, F 〉
and M ∈M∗, I ∈ I∗, Q ∈ Q∗
Where g is a cost function, ∃F : 〈M, I,Q, F 〉 is the statement that there
exists a formula such that 〈M, I,Q, F 〉 constitutes an instance of the causal
inference relation, and M∗, I∗, and Q∗ are the given domains for models,
information sets and queries under consideration.
A natural problem to consider in this framework is the problem of optimal
research design. For example, consider a scenario where an analyst wishes
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to calculate P (y | do(x)) with respect to the causal diagram in figure 7.
Since M and Q are given, the only degree of freedom is in the domain of
information sets; M∗ is just a single causal diagram, i.e. M∗ = (figure 7)
and Q∗ is just a single query, i.e. Q∗ = P (y | do(x)).
Let the domain of information sets be all joint probability functions over
subsets of V , i.e. I∗ = P (w),∀W ⊆ V , and the cost function, g(I), be a linear
cost function where including each wi in the joint probability function costs
i, e.g. the cost of P (v) = P (x, y, w1, w2, . . . w6) is 21. In this example, the
solution would be the instance of the causal inference relation: 〈M, I,Q, F 〉,
where M and Q are as given, I = P (x, y, w3, w4), and F =
∑
x3,x4
P (y |
x,w3, w4)P (w3, w4), with a cost of 7.
As a function of I, g can be interpreted as the cost of performing observa-
tional and/or experimental research, with the optimal instance of the causal
inference relation representing the least expensive way to answer the original
query. As a function ofM , g can be interpreted as the complexity of a model,
with the optimal solution representing the simplest set of additional assump-
tions that permit answering the original query — a formalization of Occam’s
razor. Finally, as a function of Q, g can be interpreted as the (inverse, when
minimizing g) value of being able to identify a particular query, which can
be combined with other causal inference tasks. For example, given a causal
model, but not an information set or query, finding an optimal instance of
the causal inference relation would represent the finding the most valuable,
identifiable query, and the information set required to compute it.
12 Discussion
Consider the steps involved in an idealized, simplified scientific method: Ob-
serve. Hypothesize. Predict. Experiment. (Repeat.) This corresponds well
to tasks associated with the causal inference relation. Observation corre-
sponds to obtaining an information set that includes observational probabil-
ities. Hypothesizing corresponds to causal discovery of compatible models.
Prediction requires generating an identifiable query. Finally, experimenta-
tion corresponds to obtaining interventional probabilities that confirm or
deny the prediction. This process can be repeated with the interventional
probabilities included in the information set.
This formalization relies on two conceptual limitations: that the variables
under consideration all belong to a fixed set of endogenous variables, and
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that the analyst has access to population probability functions over these
variables. However, within these restrictions, the causal inference relation
and causal programming frameworks are powerful conceptual tools, provid-
ing means to represent many existing tasks in causal inference, and define
novel ones, such as the (optimal) research design problems. The challenge
remains to select domains for the causal inference relation that are expressive
enough to unify many problems of interest while still permitting complete
inference rules and tractable algorithms. Implementing a causal program-
ming solver would constitute an important step towards building intelligent
systems to automate the process of scientific discovery.
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